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[Review] Donovan O. Schaefer. Religious Affects: Animality, Evolution, and Power.
Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2015
Abstract
Do chimpanzees dance? Or even more particularly, did the chimpanzees of the Kakombe valley, observed
by the primatologist Jane Goodall, dance when they approached an eighty-foot waterfall? Furthermore, is
this, as Goodall averred, an ‘elemental display’ that could be understood as an originary variant of
religious ritual? My six-year old youngest daughter has a deep and varied knowledge of animals,
especially wild animals. She is also a dancer, not only of ballet but also jazz and kapa haka (Maori cultural
performance). Although pumas are her favourite, her interests constantly expand. So when she asked
what I was reading and I stated it is about chimpanzees dancing, she, in this age of Youtube, wondered if
she would be able to see them do so. Sure enough, it was easy to find footage of the Kakombe valley
chimpanzees approaching and responding to the waterfall: https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=jjQCZClpaaY
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[REVIEW] RELIGIOUS AFFECTS

[Review] Donovan O. Schaefer.

Religious Affects: Animality, Evolution, and Power.
Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2015
Reviewed by Mike Grimshaw
University of Canterbury, New Zealand

Do chimpanzees dance? Or even more particularly, did the chimpanzees of the Kakombe valley,
observed by the primatologist Jane Goodall, dance when they approached an eighty-foot
waterfall? Furthermore, is this, as Goodall averred, an ‘elemental display’ that could be
understood as an originary variant of religious ritual? My six-year old youngest daughter has a
deep and varied knowledge of animals, especially wild animals. She is also a dancer, not only of
ballet but also jazz and kapa haka (Maori cultural performance). Although pumas are her
favourite, her interests constantly expand. So when she asked what I was reading and I stated it
is about chimpanzees dancing, she, in this age of Youtube, wondered if she would be able to see
them do so. Sure enough, it was easy to find footage of the Kakombe valley chimpanzees
approaching and responding to the waterfall:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jjQCZClpaaY
However, to her mind this was not ‘dancing’. Further on in the clip, Jane Goodall started
talking of a chimpanzee spirituality which, lacking language, they can only express through a
rhythmic dance. At this point the rest of my family, who had been called in to watch and
likewise had rejected any possibility of what they saw being ‘dancing’, erupted in vociferous
denunciations and name-calling.
How one approaches Schaefer’s book Religious Affects can be summed up by answering
two questions: Do chimpanzees dance? Do chimpanzees have spirituality? But before doing so,
there are a number of other questions that need to be asked. Firstly, when do what are described
as ‘rituals’ become ‘religious’- and why can’t they just remain ritual behaviour? Secondly, while
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it could be possible that animals display actions and responses that can be termed religion and
spirituality – if we wish to use those terms – do we not have to remember that what these nouns
mean and describe are our interpretation and meaning? In seeking to apply them to
chimpanzees, are they not outsider nouns? Of course in the world of affect, to reduce religion –
or indeed anything else - to that named by and occurring within language is the problem. The
affective turn is the turn to feeling, to feelings, to emotions, to what can be termed, embodied,
material existence and relationships. Schaefer correctly notes that in western thought, the
capacity for religion is defined in opposition to animality. While I accept that we humans are
animals, we are animals that have, amongst other things, that which we call religion. For me,
the importance is in the naming, it is words all the way down. Feelings are themselves the
naming of sensations, as are emotions, and existence itself is linguistic for humans. Of course
that may be my deep Protestantism emerging, combined with a longstanding suspicion of talk of
universal essences. So I want to ask, why do we want to even extend ‘religion’ and ‘spirituality’
to non-human animals? Both these nouns have complex histories and are interlinked with
taxonomic issues of power, knowledge, race and ethnicity, gender, ‘civilization’, consciousness,
history and politics. Of course the answer is simple: to extend the possibility of ‘religion’ and
‘spirituality’ to non-human animals is just a further extension of these taxonomic issues and
debates. It is a question of the possibility of universalistic essences at the level of animal
existence. In many ways, it is to extend Jean-Luc Marion’s description of religion as ‘a saturated
phenomenon’ (1996) as both saturation and phenomenon outside of humanity. Furthermore, in
seeking to describe what is termed ‘an affective reaction to the waterfall’(3) as spiritual and
possibility religious, are not Goodall and all those who agree with her not simply extending the
pathetic fallacy to their observation of and interaction with animals?
What has always interested me about affect is how, as in this book, it is taken to mean
‘the flow of forces through bodies outside of, prior to, or underneath language’ (4), and yet so
much has been written and talked about affect in language. Without language is it actually

affect? Without language can we name emotions and feelings, let alone what, via language,
become their particular nouns? So the intersections of knowledge, power, and, I would add, the
politics of naming, are what come to the fore in this fascinating discussion. For why would I
want to extend ‘religion’ and/or ‘spirituality’ to non-human animals? This is a political question
because is not the wish to do so a political desire? I readily admit that my refusal to do so is
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likewise political. I accept we are animals, but we are a particular type of animal that involves
issues of consciousness, activity, culture and most centrally I would argue, language.
Of course by stating this I am situating myself against Schaefer’s conception of religion; I
align myself more with Jonathan Z. Smith’s statement that religion is ‘the relentlessly human
activity of thinking through a situation’(cited in Schaefer, 6). In opposition, Schaefer argues that
religion ‘is best understood neither as exclusively cognitive nor as exclusively human’ (6). This
is part of what is labelled the materialist turn whereby religion is part of ‘embodied experience
outside the production of language’ (8). However, it is important to note that affect theory,
especially as reconceived by Schaefer, is centrally concerned with issues of power, locating
power as phenomenological before expression as thinking, believing or speaking. Religion here
is affect before it is language, before it is thought, and by extension, religion is animal affect
before we reduce it to the human. The issue for me here is yet again that of the use of the noun
‘religion,’ which I would argue is a type of retrospective description where that which occurs –
what we can call the action – can only be described, recorded, reported, interpreted and
circulated through language. Therefore, the language used is of crucial importance and so
choosing to use ‘dance’, ‘ritual’ and ‘religion’ are political decisions of retrospective description
to extend the politics of affect to the non-human. Moreover, they seek to extend the descriptive
nouns as arising from a universal essence of affect, but, crucially, cannot and do not do the same
for language. The problem for me is that animal studies, religious studies, and affect theory itself
all occur within and are constituted by and via language, and that words are themselves how
what we can label is described, interpreted and communicated by humans. In other words, what
non-human animals do is what non-human animals do, but I must interpret it via human
subjectivity and language.
So I situate myself on the side of what is termed here ‘the linguistic fallacy – the myth
that the medium of power is language’ (22); but because I am always fascinated with the way
language and words operate in the world, I read this book with great interest. For affect theory
is words, is language, to claim an alternate medium of power which is that of the senses and of
bodies, and outside of what is described as ‘the autonomous, reasoning human subject’(23).
If we turn to the central question of the ‘dancing’ chimps, perhaps a way forward is to
acknowledge that the chimps ‘feel’ which creates a response, but that the expression of that
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feeling is interpreted by humans via language and our desired referents of what is/is not
possible. The next stage is to position yourself either on the side of affect whereupon we are
open to ‘a more expansive, transspecies understanding of religion’(34), or on the side of what I
would offer which is an alternate question, and ask does not affect theory respond to what is
done ‘after’ language? That is, the power done by the linguistically constituted upon the
linguistically constituted? None of this is to discount bodies, but asks whether bodies are
experienced and responded to as embodied language by consciousness, or whether bodies are
embodied pre-linguistic feelings and affect which are then given linguistic identity and power. In
discussing non-human animals we perhaps forget that they themselves are linguistically identified
and understood via language and whatever affects we observe are understood and expressed via
language and human consciousness and categories.
Of course there are, as expressed and discussed, multiple different variations of affect
theory, many of which can be seen as part of what might be termed the biological turn in the
humanities, which could also be seen as a crisis of confidence in seeking to validate the
humanities via a turn to ‘science’. In many cases what eventuates is a reductive sub-field that is
neither science nor humanities, but rather a non-identified linguistic turn that seeks to use
scientific language, categories and words in a non-scientific, often phenomenological way to
identify and privilege what are taken to be pre-linguistic and non-linguistic affects. These affects
then give rise to actions that can become ritualized responses. It is here that affect theory does
raise important questions to do with the creation, imposition and maintenance of systems of
power which operate, at least on one level, as affect and so seek to create, discipline and
maintain feeling on and within bodies. So the question then becomes that of bodies and
whether, as in the focus of this book, we wish to proceed from what is termed the animality of
bodies and so claim a universal phenomenological essence of animal bodies within and between
which circulate affects regardless of species? If so then such affects as give rise to religion are part
of ‘semistable, complex formations of embodied sensation that have coalesced through the
advance of ancient evolutionary processes operating in deep time’(58). Human religion then
becomes only one variant of a much larger possibility arising from animal bodies, of which
human bodies are a biological subset. There are two main reasons for this. Firstly, to take
religion as the expression of a universal biological affect upon bodies. We can call this the hyperextension of the phenomenological approach and this book does not do this. The other approach
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is to use affect theory to nuance the phenomenological but also to undercut the linguistic and so
create what is termed ‘onto-phenomenology: the way that the kinds of bodies we are and are
becoming in the swaying currents of our living an evolutionary embodied histories feel’(59). In
this nuanced reanimalization of bodies there exist fascinating possibilities for reassessing and
discussing ‘how affects connect political, religious and cultural spheres to bodies’ (59).
This sets up a series of discussions concerning how the feeling of religion imposes power
upon human bodies and situates affect theory as both ‘postliberal and postsecular’(86) because
the flow of feeling and power cannot be contained, separated or excluded when it concerns
bodies. The central point here is whether we wish to rename ourselves as ‘animal political
actors’ in opposition to ‘autonomous, rational subjects’( 86-87)? But I would want to raise the
question of why there is in affect theory the desire to rename – in this case as animal political
actors – and ask, is not this itself the expression of language as the basis of identity? Otherwise,
why is there this constant desire to rename? For the use of the term and identity ‘animal bodies’
is a fascinating example of what I term affect by language, in this case the affective noun. By
relabelling myself as an animal body, as part of what are transspecies animal bodies I am, via the
construction of language, attempting to express a politics of consciousness and embodiment that
proceeds from a belief in universal animal affect. None of this critique is to deny the affective
needs and responses of the body (I am not, I hope, so much a repressed and disembodied
protestant to seek to do that!), but rather, as previously stated, to argue that affect is expressed
and understood – and missed, when affect is denied to the body – through words. The universal
animal body is therefore I would argue a linguistic biological invention for political ends, perhaps
to situate an alternative body of power – and power of bodies – against the power of what is
understandably critiqued as the white, protestant body. But in doing so, I would suggest, the
claimed trans-animality of the body only serves to solidify power in the claimed and named

human body of the white protestant (or in fact many others who are neither white nor
protestant) who does not and will not reduce identity to animality.
In the end it perhaps all comes down to the question of language: is it language that
makes us – and made us - ‘human’? If so, then it is the naming of something that gives it
meaning and identity and so ‘religion’ is language first and then embodied second in affect, for
without language and naming it is not ‘religion’ not even in potential in affected animal bodies.
For what gets called (that is, ‘named’) ‘religion’ is a naming of doing (doing by consciousness,
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doing by language, doing by bodies), but only of certain doings that are accepted as ‘religion’.
Without the noun there is no ‘religion’, there are only doings amidst a myriad of other doings.
The naming is therefore political and linguistic all the way down. For to extend the noun
‘religion’ to non-human animal body doings (and all we can deal with is the observation of
animal body doings) is a political decision of interpretation and linguistic communication by
political actors, and to refuse to do so – as I argue – is likewise a political decision by a political
actor.
Here of course I situate myself in the problematic legacy of Heidegger, in which humans
dwell in the house of Being which is language (Schaefer 152). Yet I am also open to Derrida’s
critique of Heidegger’s metaphysical presupposition as described by Schaefer ‘that there is a
straight line between humans and Truth’ (153). But if I do not subscribe to singular universal
truth then I can find a place between Heidegger and Derrida that does not mean also a
reinscription of identity as that of animalism and posthumanism. Rather perhaps we can argue
that humans stumbled into being via language, and it is language that constitutes the creation,
expression and maintenance of being and of Being. In line with Derrida religion is therefore not
a production of rational determination; it does occur and is maintained, in Schaefer’s phrase, ‘by
a network of colliding traces’ (155), but I would argue that it does so as a distinctly human
network via language.
So we return to the chimpanzees before the waterfall undertaking action. There are
those humans who wish to see this as the affective roots of religion, that is, of religion as a
‘materialist phenomenology’ which precedes the human and extends beyond the human. This I
would argue is itself a type of affective claim predicated on the linguistic hermeneutics of
identifying and naming chimpanzee action as ‘dance’ and then extending this ‘dance’ as
expression of what is named ‘non-linguistic religion’(179). On one level, we do not know if
what we term ‘religion’ or ‘dance’ (with their associated histories of meaning and meaningmaking claims and associations) are shared or even possible with and by other non-human
animals. The question - which is never properly answered- is why do we wish to believe that
they are? Without answering this question it is all too easy to propose ‘religion as an embodied
dance’(192) which is extended to ‘religion as dance of relating is animal religion: a compulsory,
affective web fusing bodies to worlds’ (192). It is therefore in service of ‘the project of
materialist phenomenology’ (201) that seeks, I would argue, the affective, essentialist pre222

[REVIEW] RELIGIOUS AFFECTS
linguistic basis of ‘religion’ via what can be termed ‘the animal politics of affect’. It further
presupposes a universal thingness called and, most crucially, experienced as ‘religion’ that
‘affects bodies first and foremost’ (211). In contrast, I would want to argue that animal religion
is human religion, but not as it is usually meant. Rather, animal religion is that which is
referenced to human religion and so is hermeneutics of affect via language from the position of
the human so wishing to see that what is described and labelled as ‘animal religion’. So perhaps
the starting place is actually where this interesting, provocative and important book almost ends:
‘affect is a productive starting place for asking why some things get called religion rather than
others’ (213).
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